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Abstract 
With the EU’s trailblazing new data protection regulation (GDPR) in force post-25 May 
2018, the importance of data protection and privacy law has increased across the 
globe. Under the EU’s old data protection Directive, a number of precedents, including 
the “right to be forgotten,” will likely be impacted by the new Regulation. While the 
European Court of Justice’s interpretation of this right in Google Spain under the old 
Directive is particularly worrisome, the GDPR could facilitate the continuance of the 
right as it currently exists or alternatively, serve to narrow it. This article will 
demonstrate that while there is indeed a strong argument in favour of recognising a 
legal right to be forgotten, there is also a danger in failing to strike a balance between 
individuals’ right to privacy, and the public’s right to information and freedom of 
expression. While it is likely that the Google Spain judgment will remain highly 
persuasive under the GDPR, this paper will also examine additional protections built 
into the Regulation, as well as other practical limitations that could assist in keeping 
the right to be forgotten in-check under the GDPR. 
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Introduction 
‘The passage of time may reverse the balance of interests involved in 
processing personal data.’ 
– Giovanni Sartor, 2015 
 
This article demonstrates that there exists a strong argument in favour of recognising 
a legal right to be forgotten. In short, this right is a key aspect to an individual’s self-
autonomy and is an important privacy protection in the twenty-first century. In 
recognizing such a right, however, there is a danger of failing to strike a balance 
between the competing interests of an individual’s right to privacy on one hand and 
the public’s right to information and freedom of expression on the other.  
I begin by looking at the right to be forgotten as it has been described by various 
scholars, as well is its relationship to the broader concept of privacy. From here, I 
address the right as it was formulated in the 2014 judgment Google Spain SL, Google 
Inc v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD), Mario Costeja González 
(Google Spain), next as it is codified under the EU’s General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR), and finally, I discuss the right as I believe it should be recognised. 
Next, I critically analyse the right to be forgotten under the GDPR by looking at issues 
surrounding private enforcement and “over-erasure” countered by structural 
protections built into the Regulation and other practical limitations. Finally, I take a 
broader view at what influence the Google Spain decision might have moving forward 
under the GDPR, and whether or not the right to be forgotten will evolve into a more 
balanced privacy protection under the new Regulation than it has been interpreted in 
Google Spain.  
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I argue that the right to be forgotten under the Google Spain judgment could 
limit the press’s freedom of expression and distort information made available to the 
public via commercial search engines. While it is likely that the judgment will remain 
highly persuasive even under the GDPR, additional protections built into the 
Regulation as well as practical limitations could help to assuage these concerns. 
 
Defining the right to be forgotten 
Legal scholars have for decades attempted to define the amorphous concept of 
privacy, with descriptions ranging from the “right to be let alone” in the oft-quoted article 
by Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warren,1 to more nuanced articulations of ‘secrecy’ 
from scholars such as Daniel Solove, who discussed it from the perspective of the 
‘selective disclosure of facts’.2 Today, advancements in information technology have 
necessitated additional privacy protections 3  against problems that Brandeis and 
Warren could not have imagined in their time. One such protection involves the right 
to be forgotten, although others, such as Richard Posner, use terms such as “the right 
to ‘conceal discreditable facts’”. 4 Put another way, Ruth Gavin describes the general 
notion of privacy as: the ‘extent to which we are known to others’ and our ability to 
control it.5  
In most modern contexts, however, the right to be forgotten is specifically 
concerned with the ‘deletion or removal of personal data where there is no compelling 
reason for its continued processing’,6 usually via the Internet. In essence, this right 
                                                          
1 Samuel D Warren and Louis D Brandeis, ‘The Right to Privacy’ [1890] Vol 4 No 5 Harvard L Rev 
193. 
2 Daniel J Solove, Understanding Privacy (Harvard UP 2008) ch 6. 
3 ibid 171. 
4 Richard A Posner, The Economics of Justice (Harvard UP 1981) 272-73. 
5 Ruth E Gavison, ‘Privacy and the Limits of Law’ [1980] Vol 89 No 3 The Yale L J 421, 423. 
6 ‘Right to erasure’ (Information Commissioner’s Office) <https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-
the-general-data-protection-regulation-gdpr/individual-rights/right-to-erasure/> accessed 30 
November 2017. 
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can be thought of as one’s ability to veil or erase personal data that no longer serves 
a purpose in the public sphere — in effect, returning the data back to one’s private 
domain. As to the relationship between privacy and the right to be forgotten, however, 
Solove would clarify that this right is but one contemporary protection that has evolved 
in the context of a much broader set of privacy-related issues 7  — one that will 
undoubtedly continue to expand as technology advances. 
 
Google Spain v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos 
In 2014, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) grappled with the issue of 
whether, and to what extent, the EU would recognize the right to be forgotten under 
the European Council’s 1995 Data Protection Directive (Directive 95/46).8 The Court 
answered the first question in the affirmative, and further, affirmed the wide scope of 
the Directive applicable to EU-established controllers (i.e. the natural or legal person, 
public authority, agency or other body which, alone or jointly with others, determines 
the purposes and means of the processing of personal data),9 even when the actual 
processing of data occurs outside of the EU.10  
The dispute in Google Spain arose between Mario Costeja González and 
Google over Mr. Costeja Gonzalez’ request for Google to remove a newspaper article 
citing a past foreclosure on his home from their search results. Mr. Costeja Gonzalez 
argued that the information was prejudicial and no longer relevant considering he had 
repaid the debt.11 The Court interpreted, among others, Articles 12(b) and 14(a) of 
                                                          
7 Solove (n 2) 171. 
8 Case C-131/12 Google Spain SL, Google Inc v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD), 
Mario Costeja González [2014] (Google Spain).  
9 Council Regulation (EC) 2016/679 of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard 
to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 
95/46/EC [2016] OJ L119/1, art 4(7), (GDPR). 
10 Google Spain (n 10) 49. 
11 ibid 14-15, 20. 
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Directive 95/46 in light of the fundamental rights of EU citizens pursuant to Articles 7 
and 8 of The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (Charter).12 Article 12(b) of 
Directive 95/46 states that data subjects have a ‘right to obtain from the controller, as 
appropriate, the rectification, erasure, or blocking of data…because of [its] incomplete 
or inaccurate nature’.13 The Court referred to Article 6(1)(d) to demonstrate that the 
reasons set forth in Article 12(b), however, were not exhaustive.14 Other reasons for 
requesting erasure could include, for example, irrelevancy, or where the data is 
‘excessive in relation to the purposes of processing at issue by the operator of the 
search engine’.15 
In formulating its judgment, the Court clarified that ‘it is not necessary in order 
to find such a right [to be forgotten] that the inclusion of the information in question in 
the list of results causes prejudice to the data subject’. 16  In a particularly bold 
statement, the Court came down firmly in favour of the rights of the individual, 
concluding that that the fundamental privacy rights of a data subject under Directive 
95/46 ‘override, as a rule, not only the economic interest of the operator of the search 
engine but also the interest of the general public in finding that information’.17 It should 
be noted that the Court made no explicit mention of the principle of proportionality 
associated with the balancing of rights under the European Convention on Human 
                                                          
12 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union of 18 December [2000] OJ C364/1, arts 7, 8 
(Charter). 
13 Council Directive 95/46/EC of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the 
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data [1995] OJ L281/31, art 12(b) 
(Directive). 
14 Google Spain (n 10) 70. 
15 Ioannis Iglezakis, ‘The Right to Be Forgotten in the Google Spain Case (Case C-131/12): A Clear 
Victory for Data Protection or an Obstacle for the Internet?’ (26 July 2014) Available at SSRN: 
<https://ssrn.com/abstract=2472323> or <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2472323>. 
16 Google Spain (n 10) 96. 
17 ibid 97. 
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Rights (Convention),18 despite applying with equal footing ‘…in the assessment of 
conflicting rights recognized in the [C]harter’.19  
 
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 
While the CJEU deliberated Google Spain in Luxembourg, lawmakers in Brussels 
were in the midst of drafting the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation. Effective in 
May 2018, the GDPR will replace Directive 95/46 and is designed to ‘protect all EU 
citizens from privacy and data breaches in an increasingly data-driven world’.20 
If the right to be forgotten was at all ambiguous in Directive 95/46, the GDPR 
has made it categorical. Article 17 of the GDPR guarantees data subjects the right to 
be forgotten (also known as the right to erasure) by data controllers for a variety of 
reasons, including: when ‘data are no longer necessary in relation to the purposes for 
which they were collected or otherwise processed’; where consent of the data subject 
is withdrawn (and there is no other legal ground for the processing; or when data are 
‘unlawfully processed’’ 21  The GDPR also provides for a number of exceptions, 
whereby there exists no right to erasure if, for example, processing particular data is 
necessary ‘for exercising the right of freedom of expression and information’. 22 
However, the Regulation does not provide a clear articulation for what constitutes 
sufficient grounds for denial under the freedom of expression exception. Instead, it 
relies on Member States to ‘reconcile the rules governing freedom of expression and 
                                                          
18 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950). 
19 Álvaro Fomperosa Rivero, ‘Right to Be Forgotten in the European Court of Justice Google Spain 
Case: The Right Balance of Privacy Rights, Procedure, and Extraterritoriality’ (2017) Stanford – 
Vienna Transatlantic Technology Law Forum, European Union Law Working Paper No 19, 23 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2916608> accessed 28 November 2017. 
20 ‘GDPR Key Changes’ (EUGDPR.org) <https://www.eugdpr.org/the-regulation.html> accessed 20 
November 2017.  
21 GDPR (n 11) arts 17(1)(a), 17(1)(b), 17(1)(d), recital 65. 
22 ibid art 17(3)(a). 
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information […] with the right to the protection of personal data pursuant to th[e] 
Regulation’.23 
Controllers must also, when obligated to erase data made public, ‘take 
reasonable steps […] to inform controllers which are processing the personal data that 
the data subject has requested the erasure […] of any links to, or copy or replication 
of, those personal data’.24 Further, controllers in receipt of an erasure request from a 
data subject, per Article 12, must ‘provide information on action taken on a request […] 
to the data subject without undue delay and […] within one month of receipt’.25 A data 
subject who is denied an erasure request may subsequently ‘lodge a complaint with a 
supervisory authority, in particular in the Member State of his or her habitual residence, 
place of work[,] or place of the alleged infringement’.26 Finally, Article 19 imposes a 
notification obligation on controllers to communicate any erasure ‘to each recipient to 
whom the personal data have been disclosed, unless this proves impossible or 
involves disproportionate effort.’27 
 
To what extent should the law recognize a right to be forgotten? 
When discussing the right to be forgotten as it was characterised in Google Spain as 
well as its subsequent codification in the GDPR, it is of import to consider what role 
the law should take in protecting this privacy interest. Many scholars highlight the 
importance of the notion of “control over information” when referring to the 
fundamental nature of privacy. Stanley Benn, for example, asserts that an individual’s 
privacy requires ‘respect for [them] as a person, as a chooser, [and] as one engaged 
                                                          
23 ibid recital 153. 
24 ibid art 17(2), recital 66. 
25 ibid art 12(3). This may be extended, however by up to an additional two months when necessary. 
ibid.  
26 ibid arts 77(1), 51(1). 
27 ibid art 19. 
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in a […] self-creative enterprise’.28 Others like E L Godkin described personal freedom 
as an ‘individual's right to control information about oneself’,29 while Richard Posner 
referred to privacy as relating to the ‘concealment of information about [oneself] that 
others might use to their disadvantage’.30 Surely then, the right to be forgotten is an 
important principle of “identity maintenance” that is central to the core concept of 
privacy and is worthy of the law’s protection.  
However, I find it necessary to distinguish between personal data that has (or 
had) a legal justification for existence within the public domain, as opposed to 
information that was exposed against a data subject’s will, with no public purpose. I 
postulate that few would disagree that in the second scenario (for example, a leak 
resulting in the publication of an identifiable person’s HIV status)31 a data subject’s 
right to erasure should be well-protected. In the first scenario, however, more room for 
debate exists. Here, competing public interests (e.g. freedom of the press, freedom of 
information from government) in processing personal data may morally justify the 
reduction of a data subject’s right to be forgotten. The task of balancing such interests 
is referred to in the European context as the principle of proportionality, whereby 
‘measures […] [may] not exceed the limits of what is appropriate and necessary in 
order to attain the objectives […] in question’.32 The crux of the issue is then finding 
this balance — taking heed of one’s right to privacy or public ‘identity maintenance’ 
while also being careful not to disproportionately erode other individuals’ freedoms of 
                                                          
28 S I Benn, ‘Privacy, freedom, and respect for persons’ in F D Schoeman (ed), Philosophical 
dimensions of privacy: An anthology (CUP 1984) 223. 
29 E L Godkin, ‘The Rights of the Citizen to His Own Reputation’ (Scribner’s Magazine 1890) 65. 
30 Richard A Posner, ‘Privacy, Secrecy, and Reputation’ [1979] 28 Buffalo L Rev 1, 5. 
31 Loek Essers, ‘This is How Google is Dealing with ‘Right to Be Forgotten’ Requests’ (International 
Data Group, 19 November 2014) <https://www.itworld.com/article/2850059/this-is-how-google-is-
dealing-with-right-to-be-forgotten-requests.html> accessed 26 May 2018.  
32 Case T-245/15 Oleksandr Viktorovych Klymenko v Council of the European Union [2017] 207. 
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expression and information. These rights are, after all, ‘neither absolute nor in any 
hierarchical order, [but] of equal value’.33 
 
The right to be forgotten under the GDPR 
In examining the GDPR’s approach to balancing these rights, there are a number of 
considerations I find important to discuss. I note that the following selection is not 
intended to be exhaustive of the issues raised by the GDPR’s right to erasure, but 
rather a balanced discussion of representative issues. 
 
Private enforcement & the issue of corporate over-erasure  
As a consequence of Google Spain and the GDPR, the obligation to balance 
competing rights will now fall primarily on corporate controllers like Google. This begs 
the question of whether, or perhaps more accurately: to what extent will controllers 
“over-erase” as to avoid appeals to European Data Protection Authorities (DPAs)? 
Put simply, the GDPR incentivises over-erasure, with fines for refusal of a 
legitimate erasure request ‘up to [€20 million] or 4% of the total worldwide annual 
turnover of the preceding financial year, whichever is higher’.34 Conversely, fines for 
approving an unsubstantiated erasure request are non-existent.35 Following Google 
Spain, the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party published guidelines (WP29 
Guidelines) for implementing the decision. 36  The Guidelines focus exclusively on 
                                                          
33 Von Hannover v Germany [2004] ECHR 294, 15. 
34 GDPR (n 11) art 83(5)(b). 
35 Daphne Keller, ‘The final draft of Europe’s right to be forgotten law’ (The London School of 
Economics and Political Science: Media Policy Project Blog) 
<http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mediapolicyproject/2015/12/18/the-final-draft-of-europes-right-to-be-
forgotten-law/> accessed 26 November 2017. 
36 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Guidelines on the Implementation of The Court of Justice 
of The European Union Judgment on “Google Spain and Inc v Agencia Española De Protección De 
Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja González” C-131/12’ (2014) WP 225 
<http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-
recommendation/files/2014/wp225_en.pdf> accessed 2 December 2017 (Guidelines). 
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instances of non-erasure, offering ‘thirteen non-exhaustive criteria to be considered by 
DPAs in the balancing of rights when search engines deny erasure’.37 The WP29 
Guidelines’ focus on non-erasure can be juxtaposed with the erasure of over 1.1 
million URL addresses between May 2014 and May 2018 in the EU, as self-reported 
by Google.38 Thus, delegating the balancing obligation to corporate controllers like 
Google could lead to ‘uncontrolled elimination of content from […] search results with 
no control by a public authority’.39  
Procedurally, the GDPR appears to lack protections for those concerned with 
freedom of expression and information as these rights relate to approved delisting 
requests. It is also unclear how one would even know about specific, approved 
delinking requests, much less be able to challenge one under the existing Regulation. 
Admittedly, much of this concern stems from the interaction between Guidance issued 
under the Google Spain version of the right to be forgotten, and not under the GDPR. 
However, the Google Spain decision will undoubtedly remain persuasive as guidance 
under the GDPR, particularly in its early years of implementation.  
Specifically, while GDPR Article 17(2) requires the entity in receipt of an erasure 
request to take ‘reasonable steps’ to ‘inform controllers which are processing the 
personal data that the data subject has requested the erasure’,40 this does not apply 
in a number of cases, one being where the freedom of expression protects a 
publisher’s original content. 41  I find this ironic, however, since by not requiring 
notification of delisting, the controller is in effect silencing the de-linked publisher’s 
                                                          
37 Rivero (n 21) 31. 
38 ‘Search removals under European privacy law’ (Google, 26 May 2018) 
<https://transparencyreport.google.com/eu-privacy/overview> accessed 26 May 2018 (Transparency 
Report).  
39 Rivero (n 21) 36. 
40 GDPR (n 11) art 17(2). 
41 ibid art 17(3)(a). 
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content because a publisher would be unable to challenge a decision to de-link before 
it is made by the search engine. Guidance on this point under Google Spain goes even 
further, stating that: ‘[s]earch engine managers should not as a general practice inform 
the webmasters of the pages affected by de-listing of the fact that some webpages 
cannot be acceded from the search engine in response to specific queries’.42  In 
practice, Google does  inform webmasters of the delisting of their content as a matter 
of policy and to protect data subject privacy, ‘but only through the disclosure of the 
URL of the delisted link’.43 Those webmasters or publishers who are notified have 
limited recourse, as they may only ‘request that [Google] re-review a decision’.44  
Regarding notification to third parties, i.e. consumers who may experience 
reduced access to information following approved de-linkages, notification is also 
hindered by WP29 Guidance. While GDRP Article 19 requires notification of this type 
unless it ‘proves impossible or involves disproportionate effort,’45 in practice, and per 
Guidance, such notification has resulted in vague statements posted at the bottom of 
web search results such as: ‘some results have been removed.’ 46 Because search 
engines use such blanket disclaimers on all searches,47 not just those actually affected 
by de-linkages, they undermine the notification’s effectiveness in alerting users to 
anything, thus ‘cast[ing] doubt over all searches’.48  
                                                          
42 Guidelines (n 39) 23. 
43 Rivero (n 21) 39 (citing ‘Preguntas frecuentes sobre las solicitudes de privacidad en Europa 
relativas a la retirada de resultados de la Búsqueda’ 
(Google)<http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/removals/europeprivacy/faq/?hl=es#how_do_y
ou_decide)> accessed 29 November 2017.  
44 ibid. 
45 GDPR (n 11) art 19. 
46 I conducted a web search for the term: ‘Max Mosley’ in the search engine Bing on 29 November 
2017. 
47 This applies to searches of myself too, despite never having submitted an erasure request. 
48 Rivero (n 21) 39. 
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Some scholars also share a concern regarding the GDPR’s ‘remove-then-
verify’49 standard under Article 18(1)(a) whereby ‘the data subject shall have the right 
to obtain from the controller restriction of processing…[if] the accuracy of the personal 
data is contested by the data subject, for a period enabling the controller to verify the 
accuracy of the personal data’.50 However, I do not share the same concern here. 
Since the restriction itself is temporary, it only applies in cases where data is alleged 
to be inaccurate rather than excessive or outdated, and thus would not apply in cases 
like Google Spain. 
 
Limits to the right to be forgotten 
Despite the concerns articulated above, there are four significant limitations to the 
GDPR’s right to be forgotten. The first limitation is structural as opposed to practical. 
As previously mentioned, controllers in receipt of erasure requests must balance a 
data subject’s right to privacy with other fundamental rights such as the freedom of 
expression and the right to access information under the European Convention on 
Human Rights and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. While still flawed for 
reasons set out above, it would clearly be inaccurate to say that this balancing provides 
no protection at all, even when taking the Google Spain judgement into account. 
Similarly, there are a number of more absolute exceptions built into the GDPR which 
allow for continued processing (i.e. denial of a request) such as when it is necessary 
‘for compliance with a legal obligation which requires processing by Union or Member 
State law to which the controller is subject…’ or ‘for reasons of public interest in the 
                                                          
49 Keller (n 38). 
50 GDPR (n 11) art 18(1)(a). 
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area of public health’, among others.51 Collectively, these limitations have resulted in 
the denial of 56.8% of Google’s self-reported delisting requests since 2014.52  
Third, practical limitations may also provide for a more conditional right to be 
forgotten under the GDPR. For example, de-linked URLs have, to date, only been 
applied to domain names used by persons conducting name-based searches within 
the EU (e.g. google.uk). In other words, persons living outside of the EU or those living 
in Europe but who use a ‘non-European search engine extension, such as ‘.com’, 
along with a non-[EU] IP address can still access […] delisted search result[s].’53 This 
geo-localisation approach taken by Google54 was in response to pressure from the 
French DPA authority,55 the Commission Nationale de l'informatique et des Libertés 
(CNIL), and in accordance with the WP29 Guidelines.56 However, CNIL and some 
scholars find geo-localisation to be inadequate under the Google Spain standard due 
to the use of VPNs and the nature of today’s highly mobile society.57 Lastly, since 
Google Spain, publishers such as the BBC and the Telegraph have begun listing 
compilations of de-linked URL addresses on their own sites as a result of erasure 
requests.  The BBC’s page, for example, explains that the de-linked URLs are posted 
as ‘removal from Google searches makes [delinked URLs] harder to find.’58 
                                                          
51 ibid art 17(3)(b). 
52 Transparency Report (n 41).  
53 Giancarlo F Frosio, ‘The Right to be Forgotten: Much Ado About Nothing’ [2017] 15 Colorado 
Technology L J 307, 331. 
54 ibid. 
55 Rivero (n 21) 45. 
56 Frosio (n 56) 330; ‘CNIL orders Google to apply delisting on all domain names of the search engine’ 
(Commission Nationale de l'informatique et des Libertés, 12 June 2015) 
<https://www.cnil.fr/fr/node/15790> accessed 30 November 2017.  
57 Rivero (n 21) 45. 
58 Neil McIntosh, ‘List of BBC web pages which have been removed from Google's search results’ 
(BBC, 25 June 2015) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/internet/entries/1d765aa8-600b-4f32-b110-
d02fbf7fd379> accessed 20 November 2017.  
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Does the GDPR strike the right balance? 
While the Google Spain decision was an interpretation of the right to be forgotten under 
Directive 95/46 and not the GDPR, its influence under the new Regulation has yet to 
be determined. Thus, the decision remains central to any discussion of the right to be 
forgotten for the time being. Some scholars, and I too, find that the CJEU’s decision in 
Google Spain is difficult to reconcile with the case law of the ECHR.59 While the latter 
court has stated that privacy rights and freedoms of expression and information bear 
equal weight, the CJEU’s decision glossed over any discussion of such proportional 
balancing and failed to refer to the rich body of law in this area emanating from 
Strasbourg. In fact, the Grand Chamber’s 2014 Judgment stands in stark contrast to 
the 2013 opinion of the Advocate General of the same court.60  
It is unclear to what extent Google Spain and subsequent case law in EU 
Member States will influence the right to be forgotten under the GDPR. According to 
Álvaro Rivero, ‘the procedure [under the GDPR] allows for [a] fair defence of both the 
right to privacy (as it is the data subject who initiates the procedure) and the economic 
interest of the search engines (as it takes the final decision over the delisting 
request)’.61 However, he explains that ‘no such fair representation exists for the public 
interest in having access to that information and the free speech of publishers, who 
have no role at all in the bilateral exchange between the data subject and the search 
engine’. 62  French lawmakers have even introduced the idea of an “Internet 
ombudsman” as a reaction to this concern.63 The ombudsman’s role ‘would be to 
                                                          
59 Stefan Kulk and Dr Frederik Zuiderveen Borgesius, ‘Freedom of Expression and “Right to Be 
Forgotten” Cases in the Netherlands After Google Spain’ [2015] 1 European Data Protection L Rev 
113, 117. 
60 Case C-131/12 Google Spain SL, Google Inc v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD), 
Mario Costeja González [2014] Opinion of AG Jääskinen.  
61 Rivero (n 21) 37. 
62 ibid. 
63 Frosio (n 56) 335 (citing Owen Bowcott, ‘France Plans Internet Ombudsman to Safeguard Free 
Speech’ The Guardian (19 December 2016) 
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supervise and provide “a content qualification assessment procedure” to help online 
service providers prevent […] overzealous removal of online materials’.64 
Moreover, GDPR recital 153 states that ‘Member States should adopt 
legislative measures which lay down the exemptions and derogations necessary for 
the purpose of balancing th[e] fundamental rights...governing freedom[s] of expression 
and information’.65 Some argue that this provision will actually prevent ‘harmonised 
and adequate’ protections for Internet users’ speech given that many states have 
failed to adopt similar measures even under the older 1995 Directive.66 I argue that a 
legal vacuum in this space could allow for Google Spain-type balancing to prevail. In 
other words, recital 153’s permissiveness could allow room for greater influence of the 
Google Spain Court’s approach to balancing these rights, at least until such legislative 
measures are uniformly adopted. It is also worth noting that the GDPR’s pronounced 
extraterritoriality could affect the geo-localisation issue addressed above, that is, 
erasure requests could become absolute and extend to all domain names under the 
GDPR. Even under the old Directive, controllers are facing litigation in European 
courts over this precise issue. For example, Google has filed an appeal with the 
Conseil d’État ‘in an attempt to overturn a ruling from the country’s data protection 
authority’ over CNIL’s extraterritoriality claims.67 Google claims that requiring search 
engines to apply the right to be forgotten to all searches on all Google domains, 
                                                          
<https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/dec/19/france-plans-internet-ombudsman-to-
safeguard-free-speech> accessed 25 November 2017. 
64 Proposition de Loi No. 151 portant création d'un Ombudsman compétent pour qualifier le contenu 
sur l'internet de licite ou illicite (25 November 2016). 
65 Keller (n 38).  
66 ibid. 
67 Frosio (n 56) 331; Alex Hern, ‘Google takes right to be forgotten battle to France’s highest court’ 
The Guardian (19 May 2016) <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/may/19/google-right-
to-be-forgotten-fight-france-highest-court> accessed 2 December 2017. 
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regardless of geography ‘could lead to a global race to the bottom, harming access to 
information that is perfectly lawful to view in one’s own country’.68 
On the other hand, scholars at both ends of the right to be forgotten debate 
agree that the exceptions provided for under the GDPR are an expansion from those 
offered under the Directive 95/46. 69  Specifically, the media exception to erasure 
requests under the GDPR appears comprehensive, aiming generally to reconcile data 
protection rights with ‘the right to freedom of expression and information, including the 
processing of personal data for journalistic purposes and the purposes of academic, 
artistic or literary expression’.70 Whereas under the Directive, the exception applied 
where data processing was ‘carried out solely for journalistic purposes or the purpose 
of artistic or literary expression’.71 Combined with the practical limitations noted above, 
the result under the GDPR could mean a more narrow right to be forgotten. This of 
course is contingent upon subsequent interpretations of Google Spain and its progeny 
in light of the new Regulation, as well as the effect of the Regulation’s extraterritorial 
reach on the accessibility of URL addresses outside the EU.   
Lastly, I find it necessary to examine Giancarlo Frosio’s article ‘The Right to be 
Forgotten: Much Ado About Nothing’,72 in which he dismisses the supposed dangers 
of the right to be forgotten under Google Spain and the GDPR. However, several of 
Frosio’s arguments as to why the right to be forgotten does not endanger freedom of 
expression and access to information are either self-contradictory, inherently flawed, 
or rely on inaccurate data. He asserts that there is a ‘limited chilling effect’ because 
the vast majority of erasure requests are rejected by Google, but does not offer any 
                                                          
68 Hern (n 69). 
69 Keller (n 38); Frosio (n 56). 
70 Frosio (n 56) 318. 
71 ibid. 
72 ibid 307. 
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substantiation.73 The problem with this statement is that Frosio fails to acknowledge 
the over 1.1 million URLs that were removed by Google since 2014.74 When the 
volume of requests is this large, even a “minority” can have a large impact. Secondly, 
Frosio cites in a subsequent footnote the statistic that Google denied 75% of erasure 
requests since the Google Spain judgment;75 this is simply not true. Frosio cited an 
obscure online article claiming the 75% figure, which itself did not substantiate its claim, 
and further, cited the Google Transparency report in a footnote that unequivocally 
states Google’s denial of 56.8% of its erasure requests to date, not 75%.76  
Frosio also claims, again without providing supporting references, that ‘the data 
[…] show that search engines process right to be forgotten requests by erring, if it is 
the case, in minimising chilling effects, rather than over-removing’. He continues on to 
argue that the ‘[Google Spain] decision is not about information being suppressed from 
the Internet. According to the WP29 Guidelines, the original information will always 
remain accessible, and no information is deleted from the original source’. Referring 
to erasure requests partially protected by the freedom of expression and information 
exception under the GDPR, Frosio fails to appreciate the practical impact of approved 
erasure requests by a search engine, even when the publisher-controller is protected 
by the GDPR’s exceptions. According to the BBC:  
 
‘It's possible to think of the internet as the world's biggest library - but 
instead of books, its shelves contain billions of individual web pages. 
Imagine being in such a vast library. It would take forever to find what 
you were looking for! Every library has an index to help you track down 
                                                          
73 ibid 324. 
74 Transparency Report (n 41).  
75 Frosio (n 56) 325. 
76 ibid footnote 105. 
KENT STUDENT LAW REVIEW Volume 4 2018 
 
18 
 
the book you want. The internet has something similar in the form of 
search engines’.77 
 
Simply put, approvals of erasure requests are, in effect, censorship of a publisher’s 
material. I think it is safe to say that the vast majority of persons searching for 
information on the Internet would find it impossible to locate something without 
knowing its exact location (i.e. its URL address), much less whether or not such data 
exists at all.  
 
Conclusion 
There is a strong argument in favour of the legal recognition of a right to be forgotten. 
This right is an important aspect to one’s self-autonomy and a key protection designed 
to address one of the myriads of privacy issues one faces in the age of “big data”. 
However, there is a danger of failing to strike a balance between the competing 
interests of individuals’ privacy, the public’s right to information, and society’s freedom 
of expression. Calibrated incorrectly, the right to be forgotten could have an indirect 
chilling effect on the press and distort information made available to the public via 
commercial search engines.  
Under the Google Spain decision, the CJEU established a troubling precedent 
for balancing such rights in the context of the right to be forgotten. While the decision 
was adjudged under Directive 95/46, the Court’s approach to balancing the 
fundamental rights under the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU—or rather its 
lack thereof—is likely to carry weight even under the GDPR. Time will tell the extent 
                                                          
77 ‘What is a search engine?’ (BBC Webwise, 6 June 2013) 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/webwise/0/22562913> accessed 2 December 2017.  
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to which this will affect the right to be forgotten under the new Regulation. Nevertheless, 
there is still a potential for the GDPR’s version of the right to be forgotten to evolve 
into a more balanced approach to privacy protection, as the Regulation more explicitly 
incorporates the need for proportionality in recital 153 and Article 17(3), as well as a 
number of expanded exceptions, not to mention other practical limitations. It will be of 
interest to track the volume of requests that are received and subsequently approved 
by search engines under the GDPR. Moreover, whether the balancing approach taken 
by the CJEU in Google Spain will retain its prominence under the GDPR is uncertain.  
A clear path forward for European Courts and Member State Data Protection 
Authorities remains to be seen.  
